

Ethnicity and Cultural Heritage: Compatible or Conflicting Concept?

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ABSTRACT

Cultural heritage embodies every aspect of culture from the past, which has been incorporated into current society. Collective urban identity includes all those individual components of collective memory that leave their spatial imprint on the city. The paper aims to research the transition of cities from the multicultural Ottoman Empire to the formation of nation-states and the management of cultural heritage and urban physiognomy by each of them. Moreover, the preservation of the collective memory and identity of cities is a decisive factor in their evolutionary course.

The methodology followed includes the comparative analysis of 5 representative port-cities of the Ottoman Empire: Thessaloniki, Istanbul, Izmir, Beirut and Alexandria, where the element of cosmopolitanism is vivid. The searching period concerns the time just before its dissolution and the emergence of nation-states.

The paper concludes that the rise of nationalism and the conflicts between states that will result from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire will irreversibly alter the population composition of these cities, which will evolve violently from multi-ethnic Ottoman cities to mono-ethnic cities in the 20th century. The abrupt emergence of nation-states resulted in the marginalization of key aspects of the cities' heritage in an attempt to create and consolidate new national narratives. This resulted in the dissolution of urban continuity in cities which affected not only the identity and self-definition of cities in global urban networks but also their development process and dynamics, depriving them of an important asset of differentiation and specialization. The lack of awareness of the importance of the cultural heritage of cities is also demonstrated by the fact that the Ottoman past should be a mere parenthesis in the history and landscape of them and is therefore eliminated from it.

Keywords: Cultural heritage, Collective memory, Cosmopolitanism, Nation-state, Ottoman empire, Urban identity.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The urban space, significantly in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, contributed mostly to the development of a dialectical relationship between ethnic-religious groups and their environment. This relationship represented the beginning of the what will later be described as “collective urban identity” (Theologou, 2008).

The term collective memory is firstly introduced by the theorist Maurice Halbwachs who stated that memory is not limited to the recollection of the past, but includes a grid of external relations to the individual, forms and objects, which support and embody the past (Coser, 1992). In this respect, architecture is one of the most significant means of transmitting the collective memory of an urban society, as it communicates a complex set of meanings and symbols through both visual and via direct experience. According to Stavridis (2006), monuments condense a narrative space that composes the indirect discourse of history with the direct discourse of memory and coexist materially and mentally in space and time.

In this context, a cultural monument is not limited to the discipline of architecture, but extends to a wider sense of the urban environment. Elements of urban monuments represent a symbolic and cultural dimension from which distinct ingredients of local identity emerge (Kalergis, 2016). Therefore, urban monuments play a decisive role in the process of establishing social mutual values and principles by registering in space a cultural and historic trace of a place (Botonaki, 2007). Cultural and architectural heritage bear the key features of history of a place, where collective memory of an urban society is recorded. In fact, according to Rossi (1991) collective memory is one of the main elements of transformation of the city, functioning naturally through society as a whole. Memory becomes the thread that runs through the entire complex structure of the city.

Cultural heritage strengthens the sense of local identity of an urban area, especially in a period of increasing competition between cities and “reinterpretation” of the relationship between globalization and localization (“glocalisation”) (Robertson, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2004). The concept of glocalization refers to the way in which the dynamics of globalization are “reinterpreted” at the local level, leading to a form of interpenetration of these two different spatial levels. Reinforcing local identity and the image of a city is also a key dimension of cultural heritage as a sustainable means of development and urban regeneration.

In addition, the sense today of cultural alienation and economic competition of the cities, justifies the dynamics of local identity and image as a unique counterweight to international global pressures (Kalergis, 2016).

According to Gottmann (1969) and Taylor (1994), multiculturalism¹ is a key feature of a metropolis. The main reason for multiculturalism is from one hand the rapid increase of urbanization, where population groups are concentrated in large urban centers and on the other hand, the increased need for skilled labor in various productive areas. In several large-scale cities there are historic reasons for the emergence of a cultural and ethnic mosaic, such examples where evident within the cities of the Ottoman Empire. However, since the 1990s, there is a shift towards a more economic approach of the urban space rather a symbolic or social prospect (Vaiou *et al.*, 2004; Stathakis and Chatzimichalis, 2004).

According to Fuhrmann (2003), cosmopolitanism is inextricably linked to the modernity and development of a metropolis. In order for a city to be cosmopolitan, it needs more than a harmonious coexistence of different groups, but requires a creative osmosis that further generates new urban identities. The emergence of nation-states at the beginning of the 20th century also marks the loss of cosmopolitanism from the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean. But nationalism, like all social phenomena, did not appear suddenly. It is therefore interesting to investigate the factors of interaction of cosmopolitanism and social pluralism with nationalism and alienation in the landscape and urban physiognomy of the case study cities.

The transition of cities from the multicultural Ottoman Empire, a multinational formation, with a linguistically and religiously mixed population, to the formation of nation-states, is the main scope of this research. Moreover, the preservation of the collective memory and the identity of cities is a determining factor of their evolutionary course (Samourkasidou, 2020).

Of particular interest, however, is the development of these cities after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the Arab world and the emergence of nation-states. For this reason, the research continues in the 20th century, where cities are in the process of building a new urban identity and reshaping their past by becoming part of a modern nation-state (Samourkasidou, 2020).

According to Fuhrmann (2003:2) “the late 19th century has long been seen exclusively as the formation period of radical nationalism and imperialism in the Eastern Mediterranean, leading up to a genocidal climax in the early 20th century”.

II. MULTICULTURALISM AND OTTOMAN CITIES

A key principle of the Ottoman Empire was the pragmatic and flexible management of diversity, with existing boundaries acting as indicators of diversity and not as well-established and solid divisions that hinder social and economic interaction. The Ottoman approach of dealing with non-Muslim communities was to absorb and integrate this diversity without changing their cultural and social culture. Apart from times of intense insecurity, the coexistence of different ethnic groups was characterized as harmonious and efficient (Barkey, 2008).

The emergence of ethnic and religious rivalry and the state's lack of trust in non-Muslim populations dates back to the 18th century and is described as a result of the changing relations of Muslim and non-Muslim commercial networks in the empire. The economic transformations of the 18th century, the growing trade with Europe and the role of non-Muslims in European trade networks led to a growing economic inequality between groups and added much emphasis on religious and ethnic rivalries. The large scale of the commercial networks and the insecurities of members of different groups within an increasing competition led to a reorganization based on ethnicity and religion and gave rise to outbreaks of violence, tolerance and respect for diversity (Barkey, 2008).

The line between the social practices followed by nationalism and those inspired by cosmopolitanism is not sufficiently clear. On the contrary, the actions of individuals are often possessed by both, so contradictory, ways of socializing. Most of the inhabitants of the Empire, had not realized until a very later stage, that the nationalistic reality of the 18th century followed a cataclysmic end of the typical Ottoman city, as it was known until then, in the early 20th century (Samourkasidou, 2020).

During the “classical era” of the Empire, there were three non-Muslim millets [religious communities] recognized by the Ottoman authority: a) the Greek Orthodox, b) the Armenian and c) the Jewish millet. The

¹ By multiculturalism they refer to a harmonious coexistence of different ethnic groups (different cultures, customs and religious beliefs).

first represented all populations of the Balkans and Asia Minor, which were subjected to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. The second included mainly Armenians, but also in general, all Christian religious groups, which did not belong to the Orthodox Patriarchate, such as the Copts of Egypt. The third millet included all Jewish populations of the empire (Braude, 1982).

To many scholars, the millet is defined as a strictly religious community recognized by the Ottoman state and referred to as a more or less unified ethno-religious unity that somehow formed the source from which the nationalist movements claimed during the 19th century the emergence of nation states (Anagnostopoulou, 2004).

The Tanzimat Reforms were crucial to the development and organization of the Empire's millet (Samourkasidou & Kalergis, 2021). The main principles of the two Decrees, Hatt-i Serif in 1839 and Hatt-i Humayun in 1856, were the strengthening of equality for all citizens under the law and their religious tolerance, Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition, Hatt-i Humayun guaranteed the safety of their lives, their properties and personal dignity. Moreover, the aim of homogenizing the population of the empire through the establishment of new administrative institutions and the construction of a new Ottoman identity (which was the main goal of the ideological effort of the Reforms), resulted in promoting the reorganization of religious communities (Stamatopoulos, 2006).

Davison (2015) argues that the Imperial Decree of 1856 contains a substantial contradiction ("dualism"), while it introduced the issue of equality between Ottoman subjects, regardless of the religion of the subjects, and at the same time it maintains the system of millet, as a basic organizational principle of Ottoman society, which is based on ethno-religious criteria.

During the 19th century, with the transformation of European states into modern nation-states and the rise of nationalism, new rules defined individual and collective identities. A population that was not a millet but an important component of Ottoman society were the Levantines and the Franks, who, living in two political and social systems, developed the art of playing with their identities. In the last third of the 19th century, the legal space, a necessary condition for "identity games", became more and more limited, as it put an end to the abuses of the confessional system (Schmitt, 2006).

The revolution of the Neo-Turks showed the equality of virtually all the citizens of the empire, only now the millet were considered "minorities". Although the empire had not yet collapsed, the nation-state mentality was gradually beginning to prevail. Of course, most of the Christian populations of the Empire had already been integrated into the Balkan nation-states created after the Balkan Wars, and with them the majority of the Jewish populations, with the exception of Istanbul and Izmir (Stamatopoulos, 2006).

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In short, after the Tanzimat period, a strategy of strengthening and mobilizing ethnic identities prevailed, in stark contrast to that used in the formation of the Ottoman State, which was based on mediation between ethnic and religious groups. This resulted in the loss of one of the most powerful and recognizable points of the Empire and its cities, that of multiculturalism, with all that entails.

The research is carried out through the comparative analysis of five key metropolises of the Ottoman Empire and their transition from "Ottoman cities" to "nation-state cities".

III. IZMIR

The period 1914–1922 is the culmination of the city of Izmir as it is characterized by its prosperity, the result of its prosperous economy with complex trade relations, its cosmopolitanism, the result of the coexistence of Europeans, Christians, Muslims, Catholics and Jews, the its semi-autonomy from the central government, the communication with Europe, the receptivity of its inhabitants to innovations and innovations but also its tendency towards fun. But all this begins and is hit by the nationalist ideologies and policies of the Neo-Turkish movement (Ahladi, 2006).

The proclamations of the Neo-Turkish Revolution of 1908 for the cooperation and cooperation of all the militias in the progress of the common Ottoman homeland not only did not materialize, but in the following years a continuous deterioration of inter-communal relations was recorded. The victory of the Kemalist troops was in fact the last episode of the destruction of Ottoman society. The disappearance with murders, exiles and deportations of the Christian population was one of the last stages of the creation of the Turkish National Republic, which, although not yet homogeneous, was following a process of homogenization (Georgelin, 2007).

The prosperity and cosmopolitan culture of Izmir, was the second largest city in the Ottoman Empire after Istanbul. The great fire of 1922 destroyed a significant part of the city's cosmopolitan heritage, around 2,600,000 square meters of residential area and 25,000 buildings were completely destroyed including homes, warehouses, commercial shops, post offices, consulates, large department stores, luxury hotels, theatres and clubs. Most affected areas were the Greek districts and less the European (Frangomachala) and the Armenian. The Statistical Service, in March 1923, reported that of the 42,945 homes, 14,004 were totally destroyed due to fire. The number of victims was almost incalculable, however, thousands died and tens of thousands left homeless. In addition, countless Christians were expelled to Greece, Egypt, France, etc., and as a result of this population severe shift it affected largely the composition quality and size of the population (Macar, 2001; Karadimou - Gerolympou, 2016).

Furthermore, the fire destroyed the city in its most vital and prosperous part, especially in the last third of the 19th century (Fig. 1): the European quarter and the waterfront (Fig. 2), where the business center was located, as well as the Greek and Armenian quarter that were also near the center, a fact that reveals the key role of the inhabitants in the Smyrnaean trade. The destruction of these neighborhoods affected the economic activity of Smyrna as well as its heritage of the cultural variety that previously marked its history and urban space. Despite that, the destruction of its built and cultural heritage created a new framework for Western investments, collaborations, commercial activity, etc. (Bilsel, 1996).



Fig. 1. The area destroyed of fire and redesigned as a Culture Park in 2012.
Source: Karadimou-Gerolympou, 2016 (Own Editing).



Fig. 2. The waterfront of Smyrna after the fire of 1922 and the resultant wave of refugees.
Source: Smyrneli, 2006, p.248.

According to Smyrnelis (2006) and Yannakakis (1992), fire did confirm the end of a standard of living, but this standard had already begun to be distressed. In fact, this phenomenon was not unique to the city of Izmir. Gradually, all the cosmopolitan cities of the Mediterranean, like Thessaloniki, Istanbul, Alexandria, etc., lost their distinct cultural character. With the end of the Ottoman Empire, the model of social organization and development it offered was ceased to exist. Nation-states that emerge from this change introduced other values of self-determination and social patterns of coexistence. In other words, the strong national feeling does not seem to go hand in hand with cosmopolitanism.

The main issue after the establishment of Turkish rule in the city was the arbitrary occupation of buildings abandoned by the Christian population. Although 20,000–25,000 buildings were recorded as destroyed by

fire, within an urban area of on 260-280 hectares, there are no official records to date.

The final flee of the Christian population, which had long been a target of the nationalists, created a fertile ground for the complete transfer of local wealth into the hands of the Muslims. This transition occurred in various ways, both officially and sometimes unofficially (Karadimou-Gerolymou, 2016).

Under the new regime, political independence was equal to economic independence. In essence, this was translated into the termination of “beneficial state agreements”. These trade privileges granted by the Ottoman Empire to the western countries on Ottoman ground were considered by the Kemalists as one of the main causes of the decline of the Empire, as they allowed the Western powers to almost turn it into a colony. The government of Ankara, therefore, rules out the possibility of renewing beneficial state agreements, in order not to repeat past Ottoman mistakes and as a result this affected significantly the trade sector (Bilsel, 2006b).



Fig. 3. View of Izmir after the catastrophic fire and looting of 1922.
Source: <https://gr.pinterest.com/pin/650770214877258268>.

It is noteworthy that the predominance of Turkish nationalism also reflected in measures concerning language: the compulsory use of Turkish by businesses, the compulsory teaching of Turkish in non-Muslim schools, the obligation of newspapers to bear their title also in Turkish and the change of Greek, English and French toponyms with Turkish.

Moreover, the effects of nationalism in the countryside of the city resulted in a loss of local identity and character, an economic shrinkage, a change of the economic model and the social environment through a process of micro-urbanization, a loss of urban characteristics in neighbourhoods such as the waterfront and Frangomahalas, but also the overwhelming cultural alienation of the population, as buildings that were destroyed such as theatres, clubs, sports clubs and schools were never substantially replaced.

The gradual weakening of economic skills, the loss of its competitive advantage, i.e., its dynamics as a port city, the loss of its special character (multiculturalism), the inability to change and adapt to the new conditions of the world economy as well as the political confrontation with central power, were all-together the main cause of urban underdevelopment. Although it continued to seek greater participation in the national and international economy, however, around the mid-20th century Izmir was considered as a small-town city, with static urban dynamics mostly treated as a holiday destination.

IV. THESSALONIKI

The city of Thessaloniki with the population exchange of 1923 completed what had begun in 1912: the expropriation and disappearance of the Muslim social group that had flourished the previous five centuries. During this time, 18,000 Muslims were located in the city, while the deadline for leaving the city was set at the end of 1924. The emigration process was supervised by a joint valuation committee of Greeks, Turks and international bureaucrats, who received the property declarations of those in the process of deportation. However, it should be noted that the process of population deportation was not particularly peaceful, with the most distressed incidents occurring in the area of the city's port. Although the city of Thessaloniki experienced relatively little violence compared to other rural areas, nevertheless, poverty, political instability and social unrest was evident, with many criminal gangs thriving at that time (Mazower, 2006).

An interesting oxymoron was that as soon as the fiery center was reconstructed in a modern style, the alleys of Ano Poli seemed like relics of some kind of authenticity. The new urban landscape was contradicted with a traditional character of a past heritage of the city. However, in addition to the issues of the "violent" deportation of the city's Muslims, the simultaneous arrival of 92,000 refugees raised a series of new urban distress.

Throughout the interwar period, Thessaloniki largely lost its complex cultural character, as it was forcibly abandoned by its Muslim inhabitants, but also gradually by a significant number of Jews. In 1928, out of 244,680 inhabitants, 47.8% were refugees, 16.1% Greek immigrants and only 36.1% natives. During the 2nd World War another large part of the native population was deceased. As a "refugee capital", the city will be able to partially reorient its dynamism despite the general adverse conditions, which were composed of the loss of the city's traditional hinterland, the economic crisis of 1930 and the wider political instability in Greece (Karadimou-Gerolymou, 2008).

Thessaloniki is a city with almost two thousand years of uninterrupted urban life, which was marked, of course, by intense discontinuities and ruptures. Thessaloniki, since its founding, was a generally prosperous city, whose main feature was "multiculturalism". While in most Ottoman cities in the Balkans, Muslims were the majority, Thessaloniki had an equally significant number of Christians and Jews. In fact, this was the place where the largest Jewish community in the Empire was located, hence leaving a significant imprint of their identity, language and practices in the city. In short, it was a place of coexistence of different cultures, populations, dogmatic beliefs, perceptions and social identities, with undoubtedly some historical distresses (Mazower, 2006; Moskoff, 1973).

Lambrianidis (2008) and Molcho (2001) argue that the cultural pluralism of the city was enhanced by the arrival of the Jewish population, along with populations from the wider Balkan region that occasionally concentrated in the city. However, the annexation of the city to the Greek State in 1912 restricted its access to most of its inland territories. Besides, since Thessaloniki became a city in the new nation's border, the imposition of the Greek element became an end in itself of the new administration.

Anastasiadou (2008) claims that with the annexation of the city, authorities aimed mostly at its Hellenization. Firstly, they encouraged the settlement of immigrants in urban areas. Only in 1916, Greek residents already amount to 40% of the total urban population, while in 1913 it was around 25%. In addition, after the 1913 clashes with the Bulgarian troops, the "exarch" began to leave the city. Similarly, Muslims were gradually leaving Thessaloniki with a population decline that in 1916 reached around 11%. This gradual decrease takes its final form with the exchange of populations in 1923, where the entire Muslim population of the city was forced to leave, while the refugee population takes its place from Eastern Thrace, Pontus, Asia Minor and Caucasus.




Fig. 4. The Jewish cemetery that was located at east of the walls of Thessaloniki, on today's University Campus.
Source: Zafeiris, 2007, p. 120-121.

Nevertheless, the hitherto hasty Hellenization of the city will encounter an important obstacle: the large Jewish presence in a city that has been one of the main centers of Serfadian Judaism for five centuries. In fact, the Jewish population was particularly disappointed with the course of events, as it foresaw the

negative consequences that would have on the local economy, the secession of the city from its Balkan hinterland and the vast Ottoman Empire. They argued that it should either be returned to Turkey or declared a free city, a kind of small Jewish democracy in the middle of a huge free trade zone. Thus, the rifts between the Greek authorities of the city and the Jewish community will soon emerge, with the most important disagreement over the urban plan of Emprar, which foresaw the destruction of the Jewish cemetery, under the pretext of consolidating the urban landscape (Mavrogordatos, 1983).

In this point of view of anti-Semitism that prevailed since the 1920s, more and more Jews were leaving for Europe or America. In total, it was estimated that about 25,000 Jews left the city between 1912 and 1940. However, the multilingual Thessaloniki, which the Ottoman Empire bequeathed to the Greek State, would really disappear only during the German occupation, especially in 1943 with the deportations to Auschwitz, Birkenau and Belsen (Anastasiadou, 2008).

From now on, Thessaloniki was entirely Greek, in population and of the image of its urban landscape. Over the years, the Ottoman city had gradually disappeared and was limited to some ruined monuments. Mosques were the first to disappear while the Byzantine churches were restored rapidly. Similarly, streets and the place names changed, while the fire of 1917 offer an opportunity to further “facilitate” the Hellenization of the city. After this terrible disaster, the municipal authorities rebuilt their city with an emphasis mainly on urbanization (Karadimou-Gerolymou, 1995).

In 1920 the Ephorate of Byzantine Monuments was founded. The restoration of the city's temples, with unbuild urban blocks, reveals the importance that the local community attaches to their historical heritage. The material reappearance of Byzantium took place for reasons of psychological uplift of the Greek population. The centuries of Ottoman rule were written down as a long historical parenthesis, as the dark years of oppression and stagnation. Any surviving monuments that referred to this period, threatened the new Europeanized image of the city. This was the main explanation for the demolition of minarets and the destruction of cemeteries. Anything post-Byzantine in the city was in danger, except for the White Tower which acquired a symbolic character for the city. It is worth mentioning that only in the 1980s the state initiates funds for the restoration of Ottoman monuments (Ioannou, 1984; Mazower, 2006).

However, the process of Hellenization experienced by Thessaloniki was no surprise as during that time the same policy was applied on the other side of the Aegean, where the Turkish government was performing the opposite. In fact, the methods were the same: population displacements, oppressive measures, gnawing of traditional privileges, laws that forced minorities to comply with the laws enacted by the sovereign nation, destruction of the architectural heritage, etc.

V. ISTANBUL

The Ottoman Empire, as a multinational formation with a linguistically and religiously mixed population, did not escape the pursuit of nation-states in the 19th century. Thus, during the period from the middle of the 18th to the beginning of the 20th century, several independent states emerged within it. Ottomanism, the ideology that followed the Tanzimat reform movement (Samourkasidou & Kalergis, 2021), can be seen as an attempt to reconcile the diverged interests of the individual people of the Empire within a parliamentary system (Güven, 2006).

An important reason for the failure of the “Ottoman idea” was the fact that there was no Muslim bourgeoisie that could function as the leader of the new system. The middle -class bourgeoisie of the multinational society of the Empire consisted almost exclusively of non-Muslim religious communities and they were politically committed to the struggle for the establishment of their nation-states (Güven, 2006).

In the years 1913-1914, a new era was represented for the development of the national identity in the late Ottoman Empire. The defeat in the Balkan War in 1912 was mainly attributed to the underdeveloped national consciousness of the general population. Hence, the immediate need arose to educate the people in the spirit of nationalism. In this respect, the outbreak of World War I was the ideal time to implement the new national program. An important step in this direction was the abandonment of the system of Capitulations, which was the legal basis of all privileges of Europeans in the Empire (Güven, 2006).

In the same perspective, the Turkish language was upgraded and made mandatory as a means of interaction in trade. This action paved the way for the replacement of non-Muslim officials. Under the pretext of war necessities, it was a good timing for the creation of a new “national bourgeoisie” (Güven, 2006).

Similarly, the government's economic reforms made it clear that the Turkish ethnicity had a decisive role in the Republic, where it openly followed a nationalist line that implied the Turkish influence of the economy, industry and bureaucracy. For this purpose, a Turkish National Economic Union was founded in 1923, mainly of members of the Turkish parliament. At the time of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the responsibilities of the deputies played a decisive role in shaping the country's economy. For example, they launched and financed some companies such as the Turkish National Import and Export

Company. With the support of the Turkish government and with the help of the newly established economic union, Turkish businessmen were consolidating themselves in the country's economic and banking sector. However, the union also played an important role in the acquisition of businesses by non-Muslims, mainly Greeks, who left Istanbul (Güven, 2006). In the period from November 1922 to March 1923 alone, 110 Greek and 21 Armenian companies, which had played a significant role in the economic life of Constantinople, ceased operations. According to a report in 1922/23 188,681 Greeks and another 150,076 non-Muslims left Istanbul.

The nationalization of the economy was not limited only to the commercial sector, as non-Muslim employees in foreign companies had to be replaced by Turkish officials. By 1923, 90% of all leadership and clerical positions in these companies were held by non-Muslims. Since then, the Turkish government has pressured foreign companies in Istanbul to offer as many business positions as possible to Muslims. The companies complied so as not to upset Ankara and so, for example, no Christians or Jews were hired at the Istanbul Telephone Company after the year of 1923.

In February 1925, non-Muslims in Istanbul were forbidden from crossing the city's borders in the direction of Anatolia. Non-Muslims with Turkish citizenship could only travel with a special permit, for which they had to apply for each trip. However, bureaucratic delays in processing permits resulted in serious financial losses for non-Muslims who had businesses and property outside the city limits. Also, the 1932 law "Occupations and functions provided for Turkish citizens" announced the prohibition of certain professions for foreigners (Güven, 2006).

By the middle of the 19th century, the ethnic and religious origins of civil servants in the Ottoman bureaucracy had changed. More and more non-Muslims who had been educated in modern Ottoman schools had found employment opportunities in the central and regional state bureaucracies. Between 1850 and 1908, around 29% of the employees in the Foreign Ministry of the Ottoman Empire were non-Muslims. However, no non-Muslim was hired in public during the Kemalist regime. In 1924, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the state bureaucracy was regulated by law. According to Article 4 of the Civil Servants Decree, a condition for admission to the public sector was that the applicant should be Turkish (Findley, 2014).

Other components of the Turkish nationalistic policies of the Empire and Istanbul in particular were: a) the Turkification of the language, b) the Turkification of the cultural and educational institutions and c) the settlement policy.

This situation is also underlined by Eldem (1993), who claims that after the 1950s, Galatasaray underwent the most radical and traumatic change in its history: it did not only suffer from the economic crisis that Istanbul suffered that year era, but, for the first time since the Genoese era, it had lost its mixed if not cosmopolitan identity through a process of ethnic homogenization. Rapid urbanization destroyed its urban fabric and many of its buildings. Eventually Galatasaray lost the most important element of his identity: it lost its name. It came to be known today as Karaköy.

VI. BEIRUT

The emergence of Beirut as an important port city during French rule resulted in a shift in its socio-cultural structure and contributed to the enhancement of its diversity. Its role as a meeting point for the French and Syrians was similar to Lebanon's national identity, which combined Arabic with European culture (Fawaz & Peillen, 2002).

Even when Beirut was declared the national capital in 1920, the city remained sparsely populated with a relatively small population until the post-independence period (1944-1958). The significant international migration wave and the displacement of the rural population to the urban areas drastically changed the demographic profile of the city, especially in the period between the creation of the State of Israel and the Civil War in Lebanon. From the 750,000 Palestinians who left their homeland in 1948, about 150,000 were settled in Lebanon and the majority of them in Beirut. Other significant waves of immigration that further contributed to the city's diversity were the 150,000 Armenians, 250,000 Syrians and 60,000 Kurds. After all, by 1975, more than half of Beirut's population was made up of foreigners (Yahya, 1994).

This pattern of migration had also affected the spatial organization of Beirut, which was characterized by sectarian recognition and grouping according to their place of origin. While the notion of sectarian recognition was reinforced in 1936, when the French asked citizens to "declare their obedience to a [religious] community in order to be legally recognized as citizens", grouping by place of origin began with the arrival of refugees in Lebanon. To this day, refugee camps in Lebanon continue to group and mobilize displaced communities, based on their countries of origin. Although many studies have been conducted after the civil war in Beirut, the majority of them demonstrate that this type of spatial organization had a positive effect on the displaced population, however it did not encourage the spatial and functional integration of the city (Martinez-Garrido, 2008).

The spatial distribution of residential areas based on religious coexistence was not something new in Beirut. Since 1860, there has been religious spatial segregation as a result of the city's demographic development and the imbalance between Christians and Muslims. This spatial pattern also reflected a cultural distance between Christians and Muslims in Beirut during French rule, when the “emerging Christian bourgeoisie” enjoying a greater share of power and privilege. Until then, there was a harmonious coexistence of religious communities and spatial uniformity. This sectarian polarization intensified after the Civil War (Khalaf, 1993; Leclair-Paquet, 2013).

This influx of rural population into an urbanized center forced polarized social groups to share living spaces. Although the imbalance between urban and rural populations was less evident in modern societies than in traditional ones, perceptions of space, social relations and the distribution of labor remain fundamentally different (Khalaf, 1983). Therefore, differences between social groups were not limited to religious differences arising from sectarian recognition but also from differences in social values that came from different backgrounds, such as rural versus urban areas. A typical example are Sunnis and Shiites, who, although Muslims, have very different social and cultural characteristics (Leclair-Paquet, 2013).

The demographic identity of the city was therefore affected on the one hand due to national and international political conditions. The formerly cosmopolitan character of the city during the Ottoman Empire, with the harmonious coexistence of religious communities, was replaced by a sectarian model of coexistence, highly polarized and spatially separated. This coexistence of different socio-religious sub-groups was also the cause of frequent conflicts in the region, with all that this implied for the development dynamics and the urban planning of the city.

VII. ALEXANDRIA

The Nasser era is undoubtedly one of the most defining periods in the modern history of the city, as a multitude of important events influenced both its urban morphology and its socio-economic physiognomy. Most important are the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of democracy, the abandonment of the city by the British, and a series of radical social and economic reforms.

This period was characterized by the rise of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism, but also by the founding of Egypt, as an independent entity and leading power in the Arab world. During Nasser's rule, the nationalist regime sought to create a new identity for Egypt, which for many years was equated with colonialism and cosmopolitanism. However, like most nationalist regimes, it ended up marginalizing key areas of its heritage, namely the 19th and early 20th centuries, in an effort to create and consolidate new national narratives (Polyzoidis, 2011; Said, 2016).

After the military overthrow of the monarchy, the property and belongings of the royal family were confiscated by the government “in the name of the people”. As a result of the nationalist measures of the 1950s and the socialist laws of the 1960s, private companies and their properties were isolated and / or nationalized, with most being transformed into government offices and public services. These actions had a serious impact on both the economy and the built environment of the city. Even today, Alexandria demonstrates an insufficiency in preserving its architectural heritage due to several reasons. The origins of some of these reasons date back to the Nasser era, when the architectural heritage of the Belle Époque was not considered a national heritage, with all that entailed for its protection and promotion (Said, 2016).

A. Impact on Architectural Heritage

Alexandria today is a monolingual, mono-racial and basically an Islamic city. The cosmopolitan character of the city has ceased to exist and the modern architectural heritage of the pre-revolutionary period is in danger of destruction (Awad, 1996).

The policies of the new regime regarding the management of the built environment, like the nationalization and isolation of properties of the social elite and their subsequent adapted reuse, as well as the institutional framework for rent control, had a decisive effect on the deterioration and devaluation of Belle Époque architecture heritage (Said, 2016).

The majority of the suburban buildings in the European Quarter are in relatively poor condition and in need of maintenance, this also reinforces the arguments against “fair rent” legislation and the consequent inability of landlords to maintain and upgrade their properties, in case of private buildings (Said, 2016).

Although isolated and nationalized properties were converted into government offices and services, they were deteriorated rapidly due to lack of maintenance and inappropriate interventions. Further studies demonstrate that these buildings were in relatively better condition than their private counterparts. There were indeed a number of asymptomatic additions and interventions, which were not limited to public nationalized properties (Fig. 5), but extended to private ones (Fig. 6). This fact was signaling a prevailing trend showing a lack of experience and know-how and a lack of integration of architectural heritage in the modern urban fabric of the city that was not limited to government structures but to the whole of the remarkable built environment (Said, 2016).




Fig. 5. Addition of 3 floors in the form of a “box” on the facade of the Administration building of the University of Alexandria. The figure on the left depicts the building of the Italian naval hospital.
Source: Awad, 2008, p. 209.



Fig. 6. The Majestic Hotel (private owned) before and after the demolition of the typical domes, the addition of two floors and the reconstruction of new domes. Source: Said, 2016, p.66.

Among the buildings “used” for public use education buildings like schools received significant pressure. The nature of this use combined with the lack of maintenance caused significant damage to these buildings. As public schools offer free education, the available budget was not sufficient for the required maintenance actions, resulting in their constant devaluation (Starr, 2005).



Fig. 7. The Villa Aghion that was demolished to be replaced with shopping mall and a residential complex.
Source: Said, 2016, p. 67.

With the exception of the central government building that was destroyed and collapsed after the events of the 2011 revolution, all other buildings that were demolished were replaced by high-rise apartment buildings, as a result of the “frozen rent” policy (Said, 2016). In fact, the most negative element of this

condition was that a significant number of these buildings were demolished during the 21st century, when the importance of protecting and preserving the architectural heritage of a place is an utmost importance. It represents the source and ground upon which collective memory of the place is ensured and urban identity is forged (Kalergis, 2012).

The rapid growth and expansion of the city during Nasser's reign failed to meet the housing needs of its population and continued to grow at an alarming rate. State housing policy did not meet high demand. This, combined with the “frozen rents” and the declining post-war economy, put significant pressure on the existing building stock, leading to the creation of slums and the deterioration of the city's built environment as a whole, including its architectural heritage (Awad, 1992).



Fig. 8. The Villa number 3011 in the list of Architectural Heritage that was demolished and replaced by a multi-storey residential building. Source: Said, 2016, p. 67

The lack of awareness of the importance of the heritage and history of the city was also evidenced in Mansheya Square was insufficiently restored. The urban character of the square continues to degenerate while the deterioration of its buildings was due to lack of maintenance, an effect as mentioned above of the socialist measures of devaluation and control of the rent. Its urban environment was threatened by inappropriate remodeling and additions that were not in line with its urban physiognomy. In addition, the housing crisis and the conditions of poverty that prevailed in the city, caused cases of appropriation and encroachment of its public space by peddlers and the homeless (Awad, 1996; Dessouki, 2012).

B. Impact on Cultural Heritage

Nasser's policies not only had an impact on the political scene, but also had a profound effect on the affluent communities, foreign and Egyptian, living in Egypt at that period. The policies of the new regime sought to replace elitism, capitalism and cosmopolitan pluralism with an emphasis on state socialism and nationalism. For Nasser, foreign communities had played a major role in the country's corruption, and the elite enjoyed excessive and unwarranted privileges. Thus, aggressive measures were adopted against the upper class. These were policies of the foreign elites issued in the 1950s and policies of the Egyptian elites issued in the 1960s, reflecting the political revolution (1952–1961) and the social revolution (1961–1967) (Awad, 1992).

In order to support the new national narratives, an attempt was made to silence everything related to the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. The main square and the surrounding streets were renamed: Muhammad Ali Square became Liberation Square or Midan Al-Tahrir and the statue of Khedive Ismail in the French Gardens was first covered and then demolished (in 1966), while the monument dedicated to Ismail Pasha II, was dedicated to the Unknown Navy Soldier. According to local legends, the statue of Mohammed Ali was covered for a long time, while the bronze inscriptions on the pedestal bearing the name of the regent were removed and were never restored, leaving the pedestal without the necessary information about the name of the statue with a significant negative impact on the collective memory of the city (Said, 2016).




Fig. 9. The statue of Hedivis Ishmael in cover. Source: Said, 2016, p.56.



Fig. 10. The Monument of the Unknown Soldier today without the statue of Hedivis Ishmael. Source: Said, 2016, p. 56.

Since the 1950s and 1960s, cosmopolitanism has been associated and identified with the colonial system, which has fallen into disfavor. The public figure of Alexandria therefore followed these political ideologies. This, according to Nasser, was achieved through the renaming of streets and the removal of statues of unreliable former rulers. With the completion of these processes, the role of the city's foreign minority communities in the formation of its physiognomy was constantly reduced or even completely ignored (Starr, 2005).

VIII. ETHNICITY AND CULTURAL HERITAGE

A. *Identity Vortex*

In the 19th century, there was a polarization, if not separation, of social groups in all cities of the Ottoman period mentioned above. Living among “common” people offered the opportunity to benefit from the religious, social and meaningful contribution of their community in: education, health, social cohesion, etc. Thus, at the same time, the various communities were trapped in a dynamic reconfirmation of their own identity, which led to multiple implications on their urban composition.

The rise of nationalism and the conflicts between the states that occurred from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire altered irreparably the population composition of these cities: from multinational Ottomans evolved violently in the 20th century into mono-ethnic cities.

B. Abolition of the Past

All administrations since the emergence of the new Nation-States considered that the period when the cities were part of the Ottoman Empire should be abolished as soon as possible both from their urban typology and function. The Ottoman past was considered as a simple parenthesis in the history and landscape of these cities. In practice, this approach resulted in the erasure of the oriental element (in Beirut), the Muslim element (in Thessaloniki), the Christian element (in Istanbul and Izmir) or the colonial element (in Alexandria). In any case, it caused a significant, if not total, loss of the cosmopolitan character of all mentioned cities.

C. Loss of Identity

The abrupt emergence of nation-states also resulted in the marginalization of key areas of urban heritage, cultural and architectural, in an effort to create and consolidate new national narratives. This resulted in the weakening of urban continuity in cities, which affected not only the identity and self-determination of local identity within existing global urban networks, but also their development process and dynamics, depriving them of a significant chapter of urban diversification and distinction. Moreover, the sense of cultural alienation and economic competition of cities, makes the dynamics of local identity and image of an area as a unique counterweight to these international pressures (Kalergis, 2016).

IX. CONCLUSION

The loss of architectural and cultural heritage through an aggressive and often destructive policies pursued by the States that succeeded the Ottoman Empire, combined with the loss of cosmopolitan character of the cities in the context of their “ethnic cleansing”, represent the main factors of urban development lag in the middle of the 20th century (in comparison to the 19th century). The cultural heritage of cities in general follows a broad dimension of the concept of the monument in anything that can transmit information from our past (Zivas, 1997). In this context, a monument is not only a building, but rather an environment with a variety of features, a narrative both material and immaterial. These particular elements of the city's monuments, as a whole, represent a symbolic and cultural field from which elements of local identity emerge (Kalergis, 2016). Therefore, the monuments play a decisive role in the process of creating coherent moral values as they register in space a permanent trace, a foundation of memorial and historical solidarity of a place. In this respect, the city is considered as the place where collective memory is recorded. According to Rossi (1991) the collective memory is one of the main elements of the transformation of a city.

The conscious and targeted loss of cultural and architectural heritage in combination with the transformation of their cosmopolitan character were the main parameters of negative urban management of all cities mentioned above. Today there is, to some extent in those cities, a sense of a nostalgic and idealized (and very often commercialized) recollection of their multiethnic and multicultural past.

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